T
he Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (P.L. 100-360), signed into law July 1, 1988 , is the offspring of Secretary of Health and Human Services Otis Bowen's proposals to deal with acute care costs for the elderly and disabled. (Bowen's report also addressed longterm care costs for the Medicare population and catastrophic costs for the non-Medicare population.) The new Medicare benefits enacted by Congress are considerably greater than the expansion proposed by Secretary Bowen, however-providing a 7 percent increase when fully implemented, instead of 3 percent. Higher benefits result primarily from a lower cap on copayment costs and the addition of coverage for prescription drug costs. The act conforms to Bowen's original proposal in that the benefits are to be financed entirely by Medicare enrollees. However, Congress introduced an income-related mechanism that represents a major change in Medicare's financing.
In this article, we first describe the new Medicare and related Medicaid benefits, comparing them to benefits as they were before passage of the act. We then describe the act's financing provisions and simulate the impact of the benefit and financing provisions on Medicare enrollees had the provisions of the act been fully effective throughout 1988.
Comparison Of Benefits
Under the new legislation, Medicare's benefit structure changes significantly; however, most current limits on preventive services and long-term care remain. Exhibit 1 gives a detailed comparison of the benefits.
Hospital Insurance. For 1989, only Hospital Insurance (HI) benefits under Medicare Part A will change. First, Medicare will pay all acute care hospital inpatient costs above an annual deductible of $560 for 1989. Currently, the number of hospital days for which Medicare will pay in a single spell of illness is limited; enrollees may be liable for more than one hospital deductible; and coinsurance amounts are payable after the sixtieth day in each spell of illness.
Second, the limit on skilled nursing facility (SNF) stays will be changed from 100 days in each spell to 150 days a year, with no prior hospital stay required. Coinsurance payments will be required only for the first eight days each year, at 20 percent of average SNF costs per day ($25.50 for 1989). In 1988 under current law, coinsurance of $67.50 is payable on the twenty-first through one-hundredth days in each spell of illness.
Third, the current 210-day lifetime limit on hospice benefits will be eliminated, although a cost limit will remain. Small coinsurance requirements for drug and in-home respite expenses will continue.
Effective in January 1990, the limits for home health care will be CATASTROPHIC ACT 81 The act eliminated the spell of illness concept. A spell began with a hospital admission and ended on the sixty-first day following discharge from the hospital or from a skilled nursing facility entered after the hospital stay.
relaxed, so that enrollees may receive up to thirty-eight consecutive days of care, seven days a week. The current requirement that home health care be intermittent limits the frequency of visits to no more than five days a week, for up to three consecutive weeks. There is no limit on the overall number of visits and no coinsurance requirement for home health visits currently; this would not change under the act.
Supplementary Medical Insurance. Medicare Part B's Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program covers most services provided by physicians, outpatient clinics, and clinical laboratories. Enrollees are responsible for a $75 annual deductible and for 20 percent of reasonable charges above the deductible. There is no limit on enrollees' potential liabilities for copayments (deductible and coinsurance) on covered services, and only very limited coverage exists for the costs of outpatient prescription drugs and for preventive services. 1 Beginning in January 1990, SMI benefits will be expanded as follows. First, each enrollee's liability for SMI copayments will be capped ($1,370 in 1990). The cap will be adjusted each year to keep the proportion of enrollees affected constant at 7 percent. Second, screening mammography for women will be covered, subject to the usual copayment requirements. Third, enrollees will be eligible for a respite benefit, once they incur sufficient costs to receive benefits under either the SMI copayment cap or the new drug provisions (explained below). Medicare will pay 80 percent of reasonable costs for up to eighty hours a year of in-home personal services, to relieve homebound enrollees' usual caretakers.
Catastrophic Drug Insurance. A new Catastrophic Drug Insurance (CDI) program will be phased in under Part B. Effective in January 1990, coverage will be provided for drugs administered intravenously at home and for immunosuppressive drugs after the first year following a transplant, subject to a $550 deductible. Coinsurance of 20 percent will be required on intravenous drugs, and 50 percent for newly covered immunosuppressive drugs initially. 2 In January 1991, CDI will be further expanded to include all outpatient prescription drugs and insulin, subject to a deductible ($600 in 1991) that will be adjusted each year to keep the proportion of enrollees affected constant at 16.8 percent. Enrollees' coinsurance will be 50 percent of reasonable charges above the deductible in 1991, 40 percent in 1992, and 20 percent in 1993 and after.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that new Medicare benefit and administrative costs for fiscal years 1989-1993 will total $30.8 billion. About 34 percent of the five-year increase in payments for enrollees will be for HI benefits, 50 percent for SMI benefits, and 16 percent for drug benefits (Exhibit 2). premiums and copayments for poor persons eligible for Part A benefits, even though they are not otherwise eligible for Medicaid. In other words, states will be required to "buy in" this group of enrollees. This benefit will be phased in, with Medicaid required to buy in all those below 85 percent of the poverty line in 1989, 90 percent in 1990, 95 percent in 1991, and 100 percent in 1992 and thereafter. 4 The additional costs to Medicaid from the buy-in requirement will be largely offset by savings arising from the expansion of Medicare benefits; Medicare will pick up some costs currently paid by Medicaid for beneficiaries also eligible for Medicare.
Financing The New Benefits
Additional premiums paid by enrollees will finance the new Medicare benefits. If congressional projections of costs and enrollees' tax liabilities are realized, 37 percent of new Medicare costs will be covered by additional fixed monthly premiums paid by all Part B enrollees. The remaining 63 percent of costs will be covered by new income-related supplemental premiums. The supplemental premium will be payable by all those eligible for Part A benefits for at least six months of the year who have at least $150 in annual tax liability and who live in one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia. 5 Liability for the monthly premium could be avoided by disenrolling from Part B; liability for the supplemental premium would be unaffected by disenrollment.
Rate increases. For 1989-1993, the new premium rates are set by law at levels sufficient to cover projected costs plus a contingency margin to allow for projection error. For 1994 and thereafter, rates will be increased from the previous year based on the historical growth in costs. In addition, rates will correct for inadequate or excess receipts in previous years, based on account balances at the end of the preceding year.
As Exhibit 3 shows, in 1989, Part B enrollees will pay a new $4 monthly premium for new benefits under the act, in addition to the basic SMI premium of $27.90, for a total Part B premium of $31.90. As new benefits are phased in, the new monthly premium will increase annually, reaching $10.20 in 1993, for a total monthly Part B premium of $42.60. In addition, in 1989 an estimated 36 percent of Part A enrollees must pay the supplemental premium, in the form of a 15 percent income surtax (a tax on tax liability) for those with at least $150 of annual tax liability. Each enrollee's maximum supplemental liability will be limited by a ceiling, however, set at $800 for 1989. An estimated 5 percent of enrollees will pay this maximum amount in 1989. The supplemental rate will increase annually, reaching a value of 28 percent in 1993 (Exhibit 3). 6 If current trends continue, the new monthly premium would have to increase by about 10 percent annually after 1993 to keep pace with cost growth. By contrast, the supplemental rate perhaps could be held constant after 1993 (although the maximum liability would increase) because automatic growth in enrollees' supplemental liability may be sufficient to cover cost growth. The act prohibits reductions in both monthly and supplemental rates, and limits increases in the supplemental rate to at most one percentage point a year after 1993. There is no limit on increases in monthly premium rates after 1993.
Impact On Enrollees
To assess the impact of the act on enrollees, this article simulates its provisions as though they had been fully effective throughout calendar year 1988. The impact estimates are for the entire U.S. Medicare population, whether enrolled in Part A, Part B, or both. In 1988, such enrollees will number about thirty-two million. 7 For the simulation, the SMI copayment cap was set to affect 7 percent of enrollees, and the drug deductible, 16.8 percent. 8 The monthly premium rate was set to cover 37 percent of new benefit and administrative costs under the act-an estimated $6.7 billion for a fully implemented benefit package in 1988. The supplemental premium rate was set to cover the remaining 63 percent of costs. 9 The ceiling on supplemental liability was set at 60 percent of the Part B "subsidy value," which is the value per enrollee of Part B benefits less monthly premiums payable. 10 Once the act is fully effective, about 22 percent of enrollees will be entitled to higher Medicare benefit payments because of either the Hospital Insurance provisions, the Supplementary Medical Insurance copayment cap, or the new drug coverage. Under the simulation, Medicare payments per enrollee would increase by $194 (6.9 percent), for a total benefit payment of $2,995 (Exhibit 4). HI payments would account for 28 percent of this increase, SMI payments for 43 percent, and drug payments for 29 percent. Most of the increase in benefit payments results from Medicare's taking on some portion of enrollees' current copayment liabilities. Under the act, enrollees' copayment liabilities would fall by $172, on average. 11 Average Medicare premiums payable would increase by $207, exceeding the increase in benefit payments by enough to cover the costs of administration and a contingency margin. About 72 percent of Medicare enrollees currently have health benefits supplementary to Medicare, which will affect the impact of the act. The estimates shown in Exhibits 5-9 incorporate the effects not only of Medicare but also of private "Medigap" insurance and Medicaid. 12 The adjustments made for supplementary coverage are summarized below.
Medigap insurance. About 62 percent of Medicare enrollees have Medigap insurance designed to pick up most of their current Medicare copayment costs. 13 While a variety of Medigap policies exists, this article simulates a prototype that would cover all HI copayment costs and all SMI copayment costs above the $75 deductible. Balance billing and drug costs would not be covered. For simulation, the Medigap premium was set to achieve a "loss ratio" of 75 percent, which is within the typical range for Medigap insurers. That is, 75 percent of receipts would be paid out in benefits, while the remainder would go for administrative costs and profit. It was assumed that Medigap premiums would be paid directly by enrollees, not by current or former employers. The act would have no effect on HI and SMI copayment costs for enrollees with this Medigap coverage, but it would reduce their drug and Medigap premium costs. Copayment costs would have decreased by $110, on average, falling to 71 percent of current copayment costs. Adjusted premiums would increase by $114. The change in adjusted premiums would be less than the change in adjusted benefits because of the new Medicaid buy-in coverage. Adjusted benefits currently received by poor enrollees ($1,765) are less than the average benefit ($2,647) because Medicare benefits accrue to Medicaid for enrollees who are dually eligible (Exhibit 6). The increase in adjusted benefits under the act would, however, be significantly larger than average for poor enrollees ($275, compared to an average increase of $130), largely because of the Medicaid buy-in provision.
No enrollee would have been liable for copayments in excess of $2,500 had all the provisions of the act been in place in 1988. The nearly 2 percent of enrollees who currently face such high copayment costs are primarily Medicare enrollees who lack supplementary coverage, a group that tends to be poorer, older, and in poorer health than those with Medigap insurance. 15 Only 0.5 percent of enrollees with Medigap coverage currently have copayment costs in excess of $2,500, while more than 5 percent of Medicare-only enrollees incur copayment costs over $2,500. The estimated reduction in average copayment costs under the act is more than three times as large for enrollees with only Medicare coverage as for enrollees with Medigap insurance.
This new protection against very high copayment costs for Medicare 16 If Medigap insurers were to reduce premiums, the 1988 premium for the prototype Medigap policy examined here would have dropped from $540 to $450.
The effects of the new Medicaid buy-in requirement are seen most sharply in changes in copayment and premium costs by poverty status. Estimated copayment costs for poor enrollees would have decreased by $252, to only $88 on average, under the act (Exhibit 7). If the simulation had assumed that all those who would be eligible for the new Medicaid buy-in would apply for it, however, copayment costs for poor enrollees would have been zero. Premium costs, too, will fall for poor enrollees under the act, partly because Medicaid will pay their new Medicare premiums and also existing Part B premiums. In addition, the simulation assumes that beneficiaries of the new Medicaid buy-in will drop their Medigap insurance (because they would have no Medicare copayments for Medigap to cover), thereby eliminating those premium costs. Had the provisions of the act been fully implemented in 1988, premium costs for poor enrollees would have fallen from $316 to $122 (Exhibit 8).
The net result of the act in 1988 would have been to reduce out-ofpocket costs (direct costs plus premiums) for poor and near-poor enrollees, while increasing costs for other groups. Out-of-pocket costs would fall by $469 for poor enrollees and by $105 for near-poor enrollees, on average (Exhibit 9). By contrast, more than half of enrollees with incomes more than 1.5 times the poverty line would be liable for the supplemental premium as well as the new monthly premiums, so that their total premium costs would increase by $199 for 1988, on average. This is larger than the expected decline in direct costs for this group, so that average out-of-pocket costs would increase by $94.
Conclusion
Considering only the effects of the new provisions, the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act will generate a financial gain for lowerincome enrollees and a financial loss for high-income groups-although all enrollees will continue to receive a subsidy on total benefits under Medicare. 17 Because new Medicare costs under the act are paid entirely by enrollees, new premiums must exceed new benefit payments, overall, to cover the additional costs of administration and required contingency margins. Because only 37 percent of costs are paid by monthly premiums, while remaining costs are concentrated on the minority of enrollees with supplemental liability, new premium liabilities will be less than new benefit payments for lower-income enrollees, and will exceed new benefit payments for upper-income groups-above the seventieth percentile. The financial loss for high-income enrollees would be smaller, although not eliminated, if new copayment limits could induce enrollees to drop their Medigap insurance altogether. 18 For the highest-income decile, total enrollee costs under the act would have been higher by $431 in 1988; while Medigap premium costs would have been about $450. By dropping Medigap coverage, enrollees could expect to save a little over $100, after allowing for the additional direct medical costs.
Nevertheless, all enrollees will continue to receive a substantial subsidy on total benefit payments under Medicare, and some subsidy even when only Part B benefit payments are considered. On average, if the act had been fully implemented in 1988, enrollees' Medicare premiums would have covered less than 17 percent of Medicare benefit costs (Exhibit 10). This assumes, however, that enrollees' HI benefits are entirely subsidized by current payroll taxes from other groups. If, instead, HI benefit costs are subtracted from the Medicare benefit total-to reflect the belief of many beneficiaries that they paid the full cost of these benefits through payroll taxes during their working years-premiums would represent about 40 percent of Part B benefit costs, on average. 19 Even for enrollees in the highest-income decile, payments would only cover 81 percent of Part B benefit costs. Thus, even for this least-subsidized group of enrollees, benefits would exceed premiums payable by 23 percent or more. 
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